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We study a period of severe disequilibrium to investigate whether board characteristics are related
to corporate investment, debt usage, and firm value. During the 1930-1938 Depression era, when the
corporate sector was shocked by an unprecedented downturn, we document a relation between board
characteristics and firm performance that varies in economically sensible ways: Complex firms (that
would benefit more from board advice) exhibit a positive relation between board size and firm value,
and simple firms exhibit a negative relation between board size and firm value. Moreover, simple firms
with large boards do not downsize adequately in response to the severe economic contraction: they
invest more (or shrink less) and use more debt during the 1930s. We document similar effects for the
number of outside directors on the board. Finally, we also find that companies with properly aligned
governance structures are more likely to replace the company president following poor performance.
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A growing literature examines the interaction between corporate governance and firm 
performance.  One  hotly  contested  area  investigates  whether  firm  value  is  related  to  the 
characteristics of the board of directors. Some research argues that large boards are ineffective 
monitors of managerial performance and therefore reduce value (e.g., Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 
1996;  Eisenberg,  Sundgren,  and  Wells,  1998).  Similarly,  boards  with  too  many  corporate 
insiders are thought by some to be ineffective and also reduce firm value (Lipton and Lorsch, 
1992;  Jensen,  1993).  Other  research  argues  that  optimal  board  structure  varies  with  the 
characteristics and needs of the firm (Lehn, Patro and Zhao, 2009; Boone, Field, Karpoff, and 
Raheja,  2007;  Coles,  Daniel,  and  Naveen,  2008,  Hermalin  and Weibach,  1998).  These  are 
important issues because of recent regulatory and institutional pressures that favor smaller or 
outsider-dominated boards. 
Complicating the task of differentiating between these views, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
argue  that  in  an  equilibrium  setting  in  which  the  explanatory  variable(s)  are  jointly  and 
endogenously chosen with the dependent variable, for example board attributes and firm value, 
one cannot ascribe causality to empirical relations between the variables of interest (see also 
Coles, Lemmon, and Meschke, 2011). This is not to say that firm value is unaffected by board 
characteristics, or that different types of firms do not benefit from different board arrangements. 
It may be possible to empirically detect whether board attributes are related to firm value and 
corporate  decisions  by  observing  companies  that  are  not  operating  with  optimal  board 
structures due to, for example, transaction costs limiting board reorganizations (Coles et al., 
2008).  Such  out-of-equilibrium  occurrences  could  especially  follow  a  large  economic  shock, 
coupled with transaction costs that hinder speedy corporate reorganization.  
We  study  the  Great  Depression  era  to  exploit  before  and  after  differences  in  the 
corporate sector, following a severe economic shock which was largely exogenous at the firm 
level.  The  Great  Depression  era  was  a  turbulent  time  during  which  it  is  likely  that  board 
structures were thrown out of equilibrium (that is, pre-Depression board structures were not 
optimal after the inception of the Depression; board structures needed to change in response to 
the severe and unparalleled economic downturn). The 1920s were prosperous and exhibited 
strong growth, a period during which one could reasonably expect board size and independence 
to adapt to a firm's operating performance (or any suboptimal governance relations may have 
been masked by the overall positive economic environment). As such, in the 1920s we may not 
observe a relation between board attributes and firm performance, or even if we do, it would be 
difficult  to  assign  causality  (e.g.,  Demsetz  and  Lehn,  1985).  In  stark  contrast,  the  deep   3
contraction  of  the  1930s  shocked  the  economy  out  of  equilibrium.  Assuming  that  there  are 
transaction  costs  to  reorganizing  boards  and  that  boards  therefore  re-equilibrate  slowly,  we 
expect  that  board  attributes  could  affect  corporate  performance  and  decisions  during  the 
Depression. In particular, we argue that certain firms would benefit from having large boards 
with more independent directors, while the performance of other firms would suffer if they had 
boards with the same characteristics. Finally, after the Depression ended and firms over time 
adjusted towards optimal governance structures, we may again not find any relation between 
board characteristics and firm performance during 1939-1941 (after the Depression but before 
the US became involved in World War II), or even if we do, similar to the pre-Depression period, 
causality would be difficult to assign.  
In terms of the role of boards, we focus on the interplay between board attributes and 
the complexity and scope of a firm’s operations (Boone et al., 2007; Coles et al., 2008; Lehn et 
al., 2009). Typically, as companies increase their volume and scope of activity, they require a 
larger number of board members to provide advice on diverse issues. These complex firms 
might  be  expected  to  have  more  board  members  that  provide  specialized  information  and 
advice. In contrast, small, less complex firms do not have as pressing a need for specialized 
board advice and thus do not require as large a board (all else equal).  
To consider these issues more explicitly, assume there are two kinds of firms: simple 
and complex, where we define the complexity of the contracting environment of the firm based 
on  asset  size  and  number  of  business  segments.  During  the  1920s,  assume  governance 
structures are largely in equilibrium, that is, board structures have developed as an efficient 
response  to  the  firm’s  operating  environment.  Firms  of  each  type  may  have  small  random 
variations from optimal governance due to transactions costs, but no systematic non-random 
deviations  should  occur.  The  Depression  shook  the  economy,  increasing  the  importance  of 
governance structure and the advice provided by the board. 
Our  hypothesis  is  that  the  value  of  the  advice  provided  by  the  board  of  directors 
increased during the Depression. We conjecture that this is especially true for complex firms 
due  to  their  large  and  complicated  operations.  For  simple  firms,  board  advice  may  well  be 
valuable, but less so than it is for complex companies. Thus, based on the relative value of 
advice, holding all else constant, our hypothesis is that the net benefit of board size on firm 
valuation is larger for complex firms than for simple firms.    
The  previous  discussion  focuses  on  the  relative  valuation  effects  for  complex  firms 
compared to simple firms. What about the absolute valuation effect for complex and simple 
firms? As discussed next, there are several different forces at work, which makes it difficult to   4
make an unambiguous prediction about whether the net effect of board characteristics on firm 
valuation is positive or negative during the Depression.  
First, we argued above that the value of advice increased for all firms, which suggests 
that board size should grow for all firms. Second, however, an opposing force we refer to as the 
“downsizing effect” would work in the opposite direction, encouraging smaller boards (for any 
firm  that  shrank  during  the  Depression).  Given  the  severe  economic  downturn,  firms  may 
prudently reduce their asset size during the Depression. Given a smaller firm, board size might 
logically shrink as the firm downsizes, and if this moves the firm towards optimality, this could 
lead  to a negative  relation between  board  size and  valuation.  Consequently,  it  is  difficult  to 
make an explicit directional prediction on what would happen to board size, and associated 
valuation  effects,  during  the  Depression.  Holding  asset  size  fixed,  the  advice  channel  may 
encourage firms to have larger boards, or to increase board size, during the Depression, which 
may in turn increase value. However, the downsizing effect goes the other way, so we cannot 
make an unambiguous prediction. Ultimately, we let the data indicate which effect dominates.
1 
A third effect is also at work. While a firm may desire a larger board to receive more 
advice, there may also be costs to operating with a large board. For example, coordination costs 
may increase as board size grows. Even ignoring downsizing influences, it is not possible to 
make a definite prediction about the net benefits (advice benefit minus board costs) of operating 
with a larger board; that is, we cannot predict whether larger boards will be associated with 
positive or negative valuation effects. Instead, we allow the data to document for us whether the 
net effects are positive or negative. As mentioned above, due to greater advice value, all else 
equal we expect the valuation effects to be greater for complex than for simple firms.  
If  in  the  data  we  find  a  positive  relation  between  board  size  and  valuation  among 
complex firms, and this positive effect is driven by complex firms that increased (or increased 
faster) their board sizes, this would be consistent with the advice effect dominating among these 
complex firms. That is, a positive relation would be consistent with the positive advice effect 
outweighing  the  negative  valuation  effects  of  board  size  due  to  downsizing  or  board  costs, 
leaving  the  net  impact  positive.  For  similar  reasons  we  could  also  find  a  positive  relation 
between board size and firm value for simple firms during the Depression, though as mentioned 
above, all else equal we would expect the relation to be smaller for simple firms relative to the 
effect  for  complex  firms.  If  however,  we  find  a  negative  relation  between  board  size  and 
                                                 
1 Rather than downsizing, it is possible that some firms increased asset size during the Depression, and 
therefore their boards might have grown along with firm size. Such board growth may have been to 
acquire more advice for the larger firm, among other possibilities.   5
valuation among simple firms, and this negative effect is driven by simple firms that decreased 
(or  decreased  faster)  their  board  sizes,  this  would  be  consistent  with  some  combination  of 
downsizing and board costs dominating the advice effect among simple firms. 
We  begin  our  analysis  by  studying  the  impact  of  boards  on  market  valuation  (as 
measured by Tobin’s Q). Our sample consists of industrial CRSP firms during 1926 to 1941, the 
period just preceding, during, and after the Great Depression.
2 During the Depression (1930-
1938), when the corporate sector was out of equilibrium, we find that among complex firms, 
board size is positively related to market valuation. Among simple firms, board size is negatively 
related to market valuation. Hence, our main prediction that board size valuation effects are 
more positive for complex firms is borne out in the data. Moreover, we find that changes in value 
are associated with changes in board size, for both types of firms. Among complex firms (which 
have greater advising needs and thus reap relatively greater benefits from a larger board), the 
benefits of having a large board appear to outweigh the effects of downsizing and board costs 
during  the  Great  Depression.  In  simple  firms,  downsizing  and  the  costs  of  a  large  board 
apparently outweigh the benefits because firm value is negatively correlated with board size. In 
the period before (1926-1929) and after (1939-41) the Depression we find no relation between 
board size and firm value. 
Beyond documenting valuation effects, an important contribution of our paper is to study 
how board attributes may affect corporate value and activity. To our knowledge, this is the first 
paper that attempts to identify the specific corporate actions that are related to governance-
related valuation effects. In particular, we examine whether board attributes are correlated with 
corporate  investment  and  financing  decisions.  Agency  theory,  beginning  with  Jensen  and 
Meckling  (1976),  argues  that  managers  do  not  always  adopt  investment  policies  or  capital 
structures that maximize firm value. Under this view, managers may use company resources for 
personal gain, such as job security or empire building, at the cost of shareholder wealth. In the 
context of the Great Depression, self-interested managers might have sought to preserve their 
empires (by not sufficiently downsizing). 
The severe negative shock of the Great Depression pushed the corporate sector out of 
equilibrium in the 1930s, and we study whether or not board characteristics are related to how 
firms operated in the Depression years. Interestingly, board size is positively correlated with 
corporate investment and debt usage in simple firms during the Depression, and changes in 
                                                 
2 We refer to 1926-1929 as the pre-Depression years and 1930-1938 as the Depression years. Gross 
National Product, employment and prices all declined sharply from late 1929.  GNP did not reach 1928 
levels again until 1938. We refer to 1939-1941 as the post-Depression years.   6
board  characteristics  drive  these  capital  structure  and  investment  changes.  Moreover, 
investment and debt usage are negatively linked to changes in firm valuation for simple firms. 
This result that simple firms with large boards invest more and use more debt is consistent with 
an  agency  explanation  of  managers  attempting  to  preserve  their  empires,  even  during  the 
Depression, leading to reduced firm value. In the 1920s, and again in the post-Depression era, 
we do not find any systematic relation between board attributes and investment policy or debt 
usage in simple or complex firms. Thus, our results are not “hard-wired” to occur in all settings. 
Analogous to detecting an airplane’s weaknesses during stress-tests, our governance findings 
are  detectable  only  during  the  Depression.  Supporting  these  conclusions,  we  also  find  that 
during the Depression, firms with properly aligned governance structures (e.g., smaller boards 
for simple firms) are more likely to replace the company President following poor performance. 
Our valuation results complement the analysis of Coles et al. (2008), who argue that as 
circumstances change, optimal board attributes also change. Yet, because of transactions costs 
to adjusting board size and composition, at any point in time one could observe firms operating 
with suboptimal board arrangements. Coles et al. (2008) study ExecuComp firms in the decade 
starting in 1992 and empirically document a negative relation between firm value (measured by 
Tobin’s Q) and board size for simple firms, and a positive relation in complex firms.  
Our experimental design offers several advantages over that in Coles et al. (2008). First, 
while  the  theoretical  governance  arguments  are  based  on  observing  firms  operating  out  of 
equilibrium,  Coles  et  al.  (2008)  examine  1992-2001  ExecuComp  firms,  a  period  of  relative 
stability;  thus,  it  is  not  clear  how  many  firms  were  operating  with  sub-optimal  governance 
structures during this period and therefore causality is difficult to assign. In contrast, we believe 
that our setting is a natural one to examine the effects of corporate governance because the 
severe exogenous shock of the Great Depression makes it plausible that many if not most firms 
were at least temporarily operating with sub-optimal governance structures. Second, we do a 
before, during and after analysis, and document board effects where we most expect to find 
them (in the 1930s, when the economy was exogenously shocked by the Great Depression) but 
no  board  effects  during  the  1920s  or  the  post-Depression  era.  The  variation  in  our  before, 
during, and after results makes it less likely that the 1930’s results are driven by some pervasive 
or unmodeled effect (more on this below).  
Third,  perhaps  our  most  important  contribution  is  that,  in  addition  to  documenting  a 
relation  between  value  and  board  characteristics,  we  also  link  these  characteristics  to  real 
corporate decisions, namely, investment policy, capital structure, and executive turnover. This 
helps  to  explain  how  board  attributes  affect  firm  value.  Fourth,  we  perform  cross-sectional   7
regressions to link the change in Tobin's Q, debt usage and investment to changes in board 
sizes (and number of outside directors). Fifth, by examining the 1920s and 1930s, we study 
corporate governance in a setting that is new to the literature. To the extent that our analysis 
confirms  modern  research,  it  serves  to  strengthen the  received  knowledge; however,  to  the 
extent that our results differ, it raises the possibility that what is accepted as received knowledge 
may need to be reevaluated. 
  Though we think it unlikely in our setting, it is possible that an unobserved variable 
could explain the relation between board attributes and firm value, debt policy, and corporate 
investment.  For  example,  perhaps  a  bad  CEO  takes  actions  that  reduce  firm  value  and 
simultaneously appoints a large board full of his cronies. In this case, the unobserved "bad" 
managerial trait might drive both the dependent and explanatory variables, without one causing 
the other. We think that this is unlikely because of the number of things this unobserved variable 
would have to explain: 1) a relation between board attributes and firm outcomes in the 1930s 
that varies cross-sectionally in a way that is consistent with the advising theory of boards, 2) 
valuation results for the 1930s that are similar to those found in the 1990s, 3) the lack of a 
relation between board attributes and firm value in the 1920s and again in the post-Depression 
era, and 4) economically consistent results for debt, investment, and executive turnover policies 
in the 1930s. More specifically, this unobserved trait would need to explain the negative effect of 
a large board (with more outside directors) among simple firms in the 1930s, and the positive 
effect  of a  large  board  (with  more  outside  directors)  in  complex firms  in  the  1930s,  but  no 
relation in these same firms in the 1920s or after the Depression ended, and the corroborating 
evidence from debt and investment policies for simple firms. While this might be possible, it 
seems to us to be very unlikely. 
  
II. Brief Literature Review 
A. Corporate Governance 
Much  research  studies  corporate  governance  in  general,  and  board  monitoring  in 
particular.
3 More than one perspective has emerged regarding optimal board size and selection 
of effective board  members. Lipton  and  Lorsch (1992) and  Jensen  (1993)  advocate  smaller 
boards based on productivity considerations. They suggest that larger boards could be less 
effective than smaller boards because of coordination problems and director free-riding. Jensen 
                                                 
3  See  Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1997)  for  a  survey  of  the  corporate  governance  literature.  Denis  (2001) 
reviews the field of corporate governance in the US. John and Senbet (1998) survey the empirical and 
theoretical literature on the mechanisms of corporate governance with a focus on internal governance. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) survey board of director research.    8
(1993) contends that when a board has more than seven or eight directors, the directors are 
less  likely  to  function  effectively  and  are  easier  for  the  CEO  to  control.  He  proposes  the 
following  as  possible  reasons  for  board  failure:  board  size,  lack  of  board  member  equity 
ownership,  corporate  insiders  as  board  members,  and  a  board  culture  that  emphasizes 
politeness and courtesy at the expense of frankness and truth. Yermack (1996), Eisenberg, 
Sundgren, and Wells (1998) and Bhagat and Black (2002) show that firms with smaller boards 
have higher market valuations and higher operating profits.   
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), Raheja (2005), Adams and Ferreira (2007), and Harris 
and  Raviv  (2008)  theoretically  model  the  determinants  of  board  structure,  specifically  the 
board’s dual role of advising and monitoring management. Recent empirical papers in this area 
are  described  next.  Linck,  Netter  and  Yang  (2008)  find  that  firms  structure  their  boards  in 
response to the costs and benefits of the monitoring and advising functions. Coles et al. (2008) 
emphasize the advice provided by directors.
4 They show that in firms with high-advising needs, 
larger boards (with more outside directors) are associated with higher Tobin’s Q. In contrast, in 
firms needing less advice, smaller boards (with fewer outside directors) lead to higher market 
value. Lehn et al. (2009) find that board size is directly related to firm size and inversely related 
to  proxies  for  growth  opportunities,  whereas  the  opposite  patterns  hold  for  insider 
representation. Boone et al. (2007) find that board size and independence increase as firms 
grow and diversify over time. Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas (2010) show that the effectiveness 
of outside directors on firm performance depends on the cost of acquiring information about the 
firm: when information costs are high (low), outside directors reduce (improve) performance.
5 
B. Great Depression 
The  pre-Depression  years  were  a  period  of  progress  and  prosperity.  The  ‘Roaring 
Twenties’ saw significant technological advancement, investor confidence, and a record number 
of stock and bond issuances. In contrast, the Great Depression was a period of immense social 
and economic upheaval. Gross National Product, employment and prices all declined sharply 
after October 1929. The stock market plummeted from 1929 to 1933, with the market value of 
the NYSE declining from about $60 billion in December 1928 to about $20 billion in December 
1932. The country’s real GNP declined from about $191 billion in 1928 to $141.5 billion in 1933. 
                                                 
4 Other papers that consider the advisory role of boards include Klein (1998), Agrawal and Knoeber 
(2001), and Adams and Mehran (2003). 
5 There is debate about whether board structure affects firm value. Several studies prior to Sarbanes-
Oxley document no relation between the two (e.g., Bhagat and Black (2002)), while post- Sarbanes-Oxley 
studies such as Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007), Bhagat and Bolton (2008), and Duchin, Matzusaka 
and Ozbas (2010) document a relation.   9
Unemployment increased from 4.2% in 1928 to over 25% in 1933. Following the trough there 
was an uneven recovery including another recession. GNP did not reach 1928 levels again until 
1938. GNP grew rapidly over the next five years, increasing to about $280 billion in 1942.  
A growing literature emphasizes the role of financial factors in amplifying the shocks of 
the Great Depression on a given firm. Bernanke (1983) builds on the debt-deflation hypothesis 
of Fisher (1933) and explains that as the real value of nominal debt increased, firms with pre-
existing debt became increasingly credit-constrained and reduced investment. Calomiris and 
Mason  (2003)  show  that  leverage  is  an  important  determinant  of  bank  distress  during  the 
Depression. Schiffman (2003) uses 1929-1940 firm-level data to explore the origins of financial 
distress and the investment behavior of distressed railroads. He finds that leverage negatively 
affected  maintenance  in  smaller  railroads.  These  papers  suggest  that  high  levels  of  debt 
hampered  corporate  performance  during  the  Depression,  implying  that  reducing  debt  would 
have been helpful. Using firm-level data of manufacturing firms in 1933-1938, Calomiris and 
Hubbard (1995) show that investment was sensitive to the availability of internal funds, among 
firms that faced a high premium to access external finance. 
 
III. Hypothesis Development 
We analyze the role of the board and assess how board attributes interact with corporate 
capital structure and investment decisions made during the Depression era. To do so, we first 
examine if and how board size impacts corporate valuation.  
  The Great Depression severely shocked the world economy in an unprecedented way. 
Thus, it is likely that firms needed to change their existing governance structures to respond to 
this unexpected crisis. Assuming nontrivial adjustment costs to changing the number or identity 
of directors, during the 1930s it seems likely that many firms operated with suboptimal board 
size and composition. In such a setting, it may be possible to document a relation between 
board  attributes  and  corporate  performance.  The  idea  here  is  that  while  firms  may  have 
optimized (or close to it) governance structures in the 1920s, they were temporarily stuck with 
those structures in the 1930s when the Depression hit, due to board adjustments taking time 
because of  transaction  costs.  In  this  period  of disequilibrium,  we  may  be able  to  document 
causal effects of board characteristics.  
We  analyze  complex  and  simple  firms  separately.  Consistent  with  the  arguments  in 
Boone et al. (2007), Coles et al. (2008) and Lehn et al. (2009) we conjecture that firms with 
more  complex  operations  benefit  from  larger  boards  with  more  outside  directors.  Large 
multidivisional firms are likely to operate in multiple product and geographic markets, engage in   10
more merger and acquisition activity, and use more sophisticated financing arrangements and 
marketing  techniques.  These  companies  are  also  likely  to  have  more  external  contracting 
relationships and thus have greater advising needs, which can be provided by a larger board, 
and in particular by a larger number of outside directors (Pfeffer, 1972; Booth and Deli, 1996). In 
contrast, simple firms with less complex operations would require less specialized knowledge 
and hence would require a smaller board with fewer outside directors (all else equal).  
We  hypothesize  that  the  value  of  advice  increased  during  the  Depression.  The 
Depression being a period of severe and unprecedented economic distress, we conjecture that 
complex firms which have more complicated operations would benefit more from the advice 
provided by a larger board, compared to simple firms. Larger boards are on average made up of 
more outside experts who can provide such advice but this comes at a cost: coordination costs 
increase, leading to less nimble decision-making (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992 and Jensen, 1993).   
We begin by analyzing the relation between corporate complexity and market valuation. 
Complex  firms  (i.e.,  large  size  or  more  than  one  business  segment)  generally  have  more 
involved contracting relations and therefore are expected to benefit from expert advice provided 
by directors during stressful economic times, more so than would simple firms. Thus we expect 
the net benefit of a large board to be more for complex firms than for simple firms.  
In terms of whether the overall effect is negative or positive, we do not make a prediction 
but instead leave this to the empirical evidence. As discussed in the introduction, three effects 
are at work. The advice effect would lead to a positive relation between board size and valuation 
(which we hypothesize is greater for complex firms compared to simple firms). Secondly, there 
may be a downsizing effect that leads to a negative valuation relation with board size. This 
downsizing  effect  could  occur  because,  due  to  the  severe  economic  downturn,  firms  may 
reduce asset size and in turn board sizes during the Great Depression. Third, there can be 
disadvantages to  operating  with  large  boards  (due  to  coordination/communication  difficulties 
and  slow  decision-making  which  can  be  particularly  damaging  in  a  crisis).  If  these  costs 
outweigh the benefits of large boards, we would find a negative relation between board size and 
valuation during the Depression. However, if we detect a positive relation between board size 
and valuation, and this effect is driven by firms that increased board size during the Depression, 
this  would  be  consistent  with  the  positive  advice  effect  dominating  the  negative  effects 
described above. We expect it to be more likely to detect this positive relation among complex 
firms. If, on the other hand, we detect a negative relation between board size and valuation, and 
this effect is driven by firms that decreased board size during the Depression, this would be   11
consistent with downsizing and board costs dominating the advice effect during the Depression. 
Our hypotheses imply that it is more likely that we will detect this relation among simple firms. 
It is difficult to predict ex ante how long firms might take to re-align their governance 
structures in the new economic reality. We study the Depression years of 1930-1938 in our 
tests.  This  is  not  to  say  that  every  firm  would  take  exactly  nine  years  to  re-equilibrate 
governance. Rather, testing our hypotheses requires that enough firms are out of equilibrium 
during the 1930s so that averaged across all observations, we can detect empirical relations 
among the variables of interest.  
A unique aspect of our study is that we also examine corporate investment and capital 
structure decisions in order to better understand how board attributes might affect decision-
making,  in  turn  influencing  firm  value.  The  Great  Depression  shocked  the  economy  and 
aggregate  demand  fell  sharply.  The  prudent  corporate  response  may  well  have  been  to 
downsize. Agency theory suggests that managers attempt to look out for their own interests, 
even at the cost of shareholder wealth. With the onset of the Depression, the demand for most 
products declined dramatically. Under such circumstances, managers who were overseen by an 
efficient board would work in the shareholder’s interest and reduce the scale of operations in an 
attempt  to  quickly  reorganize  the  business.  However,  managers  without  appropriate  board 
oversight might attempt to preserve their empires at all costs. These companies might downsize 
less and not reduce debt fast enough (or invest more and/or use more debt), even as the real 
cost  increased  substantially  because  of  deflation,  and  the  economy  shrunk.  Based  on  this 
agency  argument,  relative  to  well  governed  firms,  poorly  governed  firms  would  increase 
investment and debt (or not reduce them as much) after the onset of the Depression. 
As an additional test, we study one direct decision taken by the Board. We analyze the 
probability  of  a  non-performing  company  President  being  replaced,  and  how  the  firm's 
governance structure impacts this decision. We expect that the probability of a non-performing 
President being fired would be higher in firms with properly aligned governance. 
 
IV. Sample Selection and Variable Definitions  
A. Sample 
Our sample consists of CRSP firms in 1928. Of the 657 companies on CRSP in 1928, 
we  delete  firms  in  heavily  regulated  industries:  34  utilities,  68  railroads,  and  34  finance 
companies. This reduces the sample to 521 industrial firms. 
We require that all sample firms be listed as of January 1928 and not delisted before 
December 1929. We impose this filter because firms that were delisted before December 1929   12
were  most  likely  distressed  (or  in  some  other  way  affected  for  reasons  endogenous  to  the 
corporate attributes we study) prior to October 1929, and we want to focus on the effects of the 
unexpected,  exogenous  Depression  shock.  This  filter  reduces  the  sample  size  to  496 
companies.  The  final  requirement  is  that  the  firms  have  at  least  one  year  of  accounting 
information  prior  to  December  1928  so  that  we  can  examine  performance  both  before  and 
during the Depression. This results in a final sample of 446 industrial firms. 
Each firm’s accounting data are hand collected from the Moody’s Investment Manual for 
Industrial Securities. The Moody’s manual provides a brief description of the company and its 
divisions,  the  balance  sheet,  the  profit  and  loss  statement,  lists  of  the  firm’s  officers  and 
directors, in addition to other corporate data. Information is collected from the manual for each 
sample firm for the years 1926-1941. The stock price data are obtained from CRSP. 
B. Variable Definitions 
Our goal is to study the relation between corporate governance and corporate policies. 
Our governance measures consist of three variables: board size, number of outside directors, 
and the percentage of outside directors. Board size is measured as the log of the total number 
of directors on a given firm’s board. An outside director is defined as a board member who is not 
an officer of the firm. Thus, the percentage of outside directors is measured as the fraction of 
directors who are not officers. Data limitations do not allow us to identify grey directors
6 (who we 
therefore group with outside directors). We do not perceive this to be a problem because grey 
directors are generally considered to be as likely as outsiders to give advice (see Coles et al. 
2008), and our consideration of board effects is centered on the advising role. 
We define companies with greater advising requirements in two ways: large firm size 
and diversification across different lines of business.
7 Firm size is based on total assets and can 
change annually. Degree of diversification is a dummy variable equal to one for firms which 
operate in more than one business segment, based on our reading of the information provided 
in the Moody’s manual at the beginning and the middle of the Depression years. 
In  our  analyses,  we  include  the  explanatory  variables  used  by  Rajan  and  Zingales 
(1995) and numerous other studies, namely tangibility of assets, the market-to-book ratio, firm 
                                                 
6  Grey  directors  are  officers  that  have  close  business  relationships  with  the firm  but  are  not  current 
employees.  Former  employees  and  individuals  with  family  affiliations  with  the  management  are  also 
considered to be grey directors. 
7 Coles et al. (2008) use these complexity definitions and also use leverage as an additional measure. We 
do not include leverage as a measure of firm complexity because it is one of our variables of interest. 
Also,  if  we  regress  board  size  on  leverage  and  factors  thought  to  affect  board  size,  the  leverage 
coefficient is insignificant, which is consistent with leverage not being a measure of complexity in our 
sample.   13
size, and profitability. As detailed in the Appendix, we measure growth opportunities with the 
market-to-book ratio. Operating profit is earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) divided by the 
book  value  of  total  assets. We use  EBIT  because  it  is  not  directly  affected  by  the  level  of 
indebtedness. Tangibility is the ratio of fixed assets to the book value of total assets. Firm size is 
defined as log of total assets. Volatility is measured as the volatility of a firm’s stock price over 
the 12 months of the previous year. Liquidity is the ratio of cash to total assets. We conduct 
unreported  robustness  checks  using  the  ratio  of  current  assets  to  total  assets  as  another 
liquidity measure, and all the results remain unchanged. 
  We examine three dependent variables: firm value (i.e., Tobin’s Q), debt usage, and 
investment. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the sum of the book value of total liabilities and market 
capitalization of the firm, divided by the book value of its assets. Debt usage is measured as the 
ratio of the change in debt in the current year divided by the lagged book value of total assets. 
Investment  during  the  year  is  calculated as  the  change  in  gross fixed  assets from  t-1  to  t, 
divided  by  t-1  total  assets.  Finally,  the  President  change  variable  is  coded  as  one  if  the 
President changed in a given firm-year and is zero otherwise.   
Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997) point out that leverage at any instant in time provides 
only a snapshot of years of decisions about the firm’s capital structure, and may not be the best 
measure to use to test the implications of agency theory. They argue that the study of change in 
debt levels, which isolates the present decisions about the firm’s leverage policy, may be a 
better  indicator  of  whether  larger  boards  are  less  efficient,  allowing  greater  managerial 
entrenchment and hence increased agency problems.
8 Thus, in our tests we analyze the firm’s 
debt usage decision as a function of board size and other firm characteristics.  
 
V. Empirical Analysis 
A. Univariate Analysis 
  Table  I  provides  summary  information  about  the  pre-Depression  (1926-29)  and 
Depression (1930-38) samples. Panel A shows that, on average, debt use declined during the 
Depression. This is expected given that real debt became more expensive in the 1930s. We 
also  find  that  Tobin’s  Q,  operating  profits  and  investment  declined  in  the  Depression,  as 
expected.  
  In untabulated results, we find that the firms in the first seven deciles are fairly similar 
to each other, and small in terms of total assets, while the firms in the last three deciles are 
                                                 
8 In a similar argument, MacKie-Mason (1990) states that debt-to-equity ratios represent the result of 
years of separate decisions and a study of these cumulative decisions is likely to have low power.   14
notably larger. Therefore, in what follows, it seems reasonable to group firms into small versus 
large firm size at the 75
th percentile. The implications from our analysis are similar if we use all 
four quartiles to delineate firm size. 
  In our analysis we focus on the interaction between board size and two measures of 
complexity: firm size and diversification. To gauge complexity, we categorize small firms (in the 
first three size quartiles) as being less complex and having fewer advising needs during the 
Depression, relative to large firms. Large firms (in the largest size quartile) are more complex 
and have greater advising needs. Separately, we also measure complexity based on single-
segment (simple) versus multisegment (complex) firms. During the entire sample period (1926-
1938) 24.9 percent of the firm-years represent large firms and 27.3 percent are multisegment. 
The percentages are quite similar for both the pre-Depression and Depression years.  
  Panel B of Table I compares board structures across the sample, conditional on size. 
We find that in both the pre-Depression and Depression years, board size increases with firm 
size (consistent with Boone et al. 2007). Further, there is a significant difference between the 
board sizes in the small and large firms. Similar to Coles et al. (2008), a fair portion of this 
difference is driven by the number of outside board directors.   In  untabulated  analysis  we 
compare the board structure of single-segment and multisegment firms, and find similar results.
  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  mean  board  size  among  simple  firms  shrunk 
significantly (at the 1 percent level) after the Depression shock. In contrast, the mean board size 
(though  not  the  median)  among  complex  firms  grew  during  the  Depression,  though  these 
changes are not significant at the 10 percent level. This pattern is consistent with simple firms 
(that  have  fewer  advising  needs)  eventually  shrinking  their  boards,  and  complex  firms  with 
greater advising needs maintaining or increasing board size during the Depression. Similarly, in 
the 1930s the  mean number  of outsiders  decreased  significantly for  simple firms,  while the 
mean  number  of  outside  directors  increased  for  complex  firms,  though  this  change  is  not 
significant.   
  We  also  (untabulated)  analyze  Tobin’s  Q  in  a  2x2  matrix  of  simple/complex  firms 
versus small/large board size. The patterns indicate that firm value is higher among simple firms 
(both small and single-segment firms) that have small boards. In contrast, the pattern reverses 
among complex (large and multisegment) firms: Q increases with board size among firms that 
have greater advising needs. These same patterns also hold for number of outside directors: 
Outsiders are valued more highly among complex firms (with greater advising needs). In the 
next section, we examine whether these results hold in a multivariate setting.  
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  We begin the multivariate analysis by studying the relation between market valuation 
and board characteristics during the Depression years. In Table II we find that for the small firms 
(i.e.,  firms  in  the  smallest  three  size  quartiles)  board  size  is  negatively  related  to  market 
valuation with an estimated coefficient of -0.127 in column (1). The coefficient on the board 
attribute*complex firm dummy (with complexity measured by either large size or multisegment) 
measures whether the effect of the board attribute is significantly different for complex firms 
compared to simple firms. In column (1) for firms in the largest quartile, board size is positively 
related to market valuation, with an estimated coefficient of 0.436. Thus, the valuation impact of 
board size is significantly larger for complex firms, compared to simple firms.   
  To test whether board attributes are significantly different from zero for complex firms, 
we  add  the  coefficients  for  the  board  variable  and  the  board  variable  interacted  with  the 
complexity dummy. For example, in column (1) of Table II, the effect on valuation of board size 
for large firms equals 0.309 (=-0.127+0.436), which has an unreported F-test p-value of 0.001. 
The 0.309 coefficient is significantly positive, indicating that during the Depression, board size is 
positively related to complex firm market valuation. The  estimated  coefficients  imply  that  for 
small firms with 11 members on the board, an increase of one member would decrease Tobin's 
Q by 0.011, which represents a decrease of 1.19 percent in the mean Q of a small firm. For 
large firms with 11 members on the board, an increase of one member would increase Tobin's 
Q  by 0.027,  which  represents an  increase of  2.51 percent  in  mean  Q.  Similarly, firm  value 
increases with board size for multisegment (complex) firms during the Depression era. These 
same patterns hold for number of outside directors.
9 
  We perform firm fixed effects  regressions,  so our  results are driven by  time  series 
variation in board size (or number of outside directors) within firms. Our results indicate that 
firms that changed their governance structures had higher valuations. An important aspect of 
the advice effect is that in complex firms, the positive relation between board size and Tobin's Q 
is driven by firms that increased their board sizes. We test this directly in Table III, where we 
perform cross-sectional regressions with the change in Tobin's Q for each firm over the period 
1930-1938 as the dependent variable. These cross-sectional regressions contain one data point 
for  each  firm.  The  changes  in  Tobin's  Q,  growth  options,  operating  profit,  board  size,  and 
number of outside directors are calculated as the change from 1930 to 1938. The other firm 
characteristics are at their median values over the Depression years (we get qualitatively similar 
results  with  the  firm  characteristics  at  their  1930  levels). We  conduct  separate  analysis  for 
                                                 
9 In a robustness test, we add a lagged operating profit variable to the Table II regressions and the results 
are qualitatively similar.   16
simple and complex firms. In the simple firm regressions, the explanatory variables include an 
indicator variable equal to one if board size (number of outside directors) decreases during the 
Depression period. In the complex firm regressions we include an indicator variable equal to 
one if the change in board size (number of outside directors) is positive over the Depression 
years.  We  find  that  the  indicator  variables  are  significantly  positive  in  all  the  regressions, 
indicating  that  simple  firms  which  decreased  their  board  sizes,  and  complex  firms  which 
increased board sizes, experienced an increase in Tobin's Q. 
  The combination of firm fixed effect regressions and cross-sectional regressions help 
establish a link between changes in board size and changes in Tobin's Q. Our results show that 
complex firms benefit on net from director advice associated with larger boards, and firm value 
increases  accordingly.  Among  simple firms,  the  downsizing  impact  and  the  negative  effects 
(such  as  director  free-riding  or  coordination  costs)  of  large  boards  appear  to  dominate  any 
benefits, leading to reduced firm value. Further analyses (not tabulated) indicate that simple 
firms which increased total assets and simple firms that decreased total assets reduce their 
board sizes. Given that the asset increase group would not be subject to the downsizing effect, 
the negative relation that we document implies that board costs were important for simple firms 
during the Depression years.
10 Perhaps because enhanced coordination and communication 
amongst board members to take prompt decisions becomes especially important during a crisis. 
C. Debt Usage and Investment before and during the Depression 
We next examine whether board size and composition are related to corporate policies. 
We first analyze capital structure. Table IV presents Depression era analysis of debt usage 
during the current year regressed on firm characteristics from the end of the previous year. Two 
board complexity variables are included: board size and board size interacted with a complexity 
dummy variable.  
  Intriguingly, we find that board size is positively related to debt usage among small 
firms, with an estimated coefficient of 0.044 in column (1). Similarly, board size is positively 
related to debt usage among single-segment firms in column (3), with an estimated coefficient of 
0.044. On average, during the Depression years, simple firms with large boards issued more 
debt  (or  retired  loans  more  slowly)  than  simple  firms  with  small  boards;  also,  the  effect for 
simple  firms  is  larger  than  the  effect  for  complex  firms.  These  same  implications  hold  with 
                                                 
10 We perform regressions of log (board size) on log total assets and log assets squared (similar to Lehn, 
Patro and Zhao, 2009) for simple firms, and find that the coefficient on log assets is significantly positive, 
while the coefficient on log assets squared is significantly negative. This result is consistent with the 
argument  that  beyond  a  certain  number  of  board  members,  the  coordination  costs  and  free-rider 
problems associated with additional board members dominate (Lehn, Patro and Zhao, 2009).   17
respect to outside directors. Below (in Table VIII) we examine whether these capital structure 
choices are associated with reduced firm valuation in simple firms. Within the group of complex 
firms, board size has no relation with debt. To gauge economic significance, consider column 
(1) of Table IV. The estimated coefficients imply that for small firms with 11 members on the 
board, an increase of one member will increase debt (or reduce debt less) by 0.38 percent of 
total assets, or about $76,156 annually.  
  We also non-parametrically investigate the interaction between debt policy, board size, 
and  firm  complexity.  During  the  Depression  (1930-1938),  32.42  percent  of  the  firm-year 
observations  increased  debt  (not  tabulated).  Among  small  firms  that  increased  debt,  55.69 
percent are in the largest board size quartile, compared to only 6.62 percent in the lowest board 
size quartile.
11 Among the single-segment firms that increased debt, 54.23 percent were firms 
with board size in the largest quartile and only 7.03 percent were firms with board size in the 
lowest quartile.  These findings  again  document that  board  size  is  positively  associated  with 
simple firm debt usage during the Depression. 
  In  Table  V  we  perform  cross-sectional  regressions  of  change  in  debt  on  firm 
characteristics  during  the  Depression  period.  The  changes  in  debt  usage,  growth  options, 
operating profit, investment, board size and number of outside directors are calculated as the 
change from 1930 to 1938. The other firm characteristics are at their median values over the 
Depression years (we get similar results if we use 1930 values). We conduct separate analyses 
for simple and complex firms. In the simple firm regressions, the explanatory variables include 
an indicator variable equal to one if the change in board size (number of outside directors) is 
negative over the Depression period. The complex firm regressions include an indicator variable 
equal to one if board size (number of outside directors) increases. We find that the indicator 
variables are significantly negative in the simple firm regressions, indicating that, on average, 
simple firms that decreased board sizes reduced debt usage. In the case of complex firms that 
increased their board sizes, the coefficient is negative though insignificant.  
  We  also  investigate  whether  this  heightened use  of  debt  by  small firms  with  large 
boards might have been driven by liquidity needs. Perhaps these firms had to increase debt to 
cover existing interest payments, given the limited availability of other sources of funding. We 
investigate  interest  coverage  (Perry  and  Shivdasani,  2005).  Among  the  small  firm-year 
observations  that  increased  debt  during  the  Depression, 95.41 percent had enough cash to 
cover the next year’s interest expense. Thus, we do not find evidence that small-firm debt usage 
was driven by extreme short-term liquidity needs. 
                                                 
11 For the small firms, the 75
th and 25
th percentile board sizes are 11 and 7 respectively.   18
  The results in Tables IV and V indicate that, on average, simple firms with large boards 
were more likely to increase debt during the Depression than simple firms with small boards 
(and also were more likely than complex firms). These results are consistent with managers of 
simple firms with large boards increasing debt, or decreasing debt less, perhaps in an effort to 
preserve  an  empire.  To  investigate  this  possibility  further,  we  now  study  the  link  between 
investment and firm characteristics.  
  Table VI presents the investment analysis for the Depression era. We find that, on 
average, small and single-segment firms with larger boards invested relatively more during the 
1930s  (estimated  coefficients  of  0.075  and  0.084,  respectively,  in  columns  (1)  and  (3)), 
controlling for other firm characteristics. This result also holds for similar specifications with log 
of  outside  directors  as  the  board  attribute.  These  results  are  consistent  with  the  agency 
argument that firms with misaligned governance (i.e., simple firms with large boards) attempted 
to preserve their empires during the Depression, perhaps at the cost of shareholder wealth. Also 
note that we control for growth options in all our investment specifications (and in separate 
robustness tests, we also include Tobin’s Q as a right hand side variable), in an attempt to 
control for value-enhancing investment that some firms might conduct. 
  Column  (1) of  Table VI  indicates  that  small firms  with  11  members  on  their  board 
completed mean (median) investment of about $129,812 ($102,647) less than a similar firm with 
12 directors. The mean (median) value of fixed assets for the small firms in the 1930s is $9.32 
million  ($6.12  million) and hence, the  incremental  investment  by  a  board  of 12  members  in 
comparison to a similar firm with 11 board members is 1.39 percent (1.68 percent) of the firm’s 
fixed assets, annually. On average, during the Depression, this implies that simple firms with 12 
members downsized by  about 1.39  percent  less  each  year than did  their  11-member-board 
peers. This is a large relative effect during a period of sharply declining economic activity.  
  Non-parametric analysis shows that 50.64 percent of the firm-year observations have 
positive  investment  in  the  Depression  (not  tabulated).  Among  small  firms  that  increased 
investment, 53.89 percent are in the largest board size quartile, compared to only 7.66 percent 
in the smallest board size quartile. Among the single-segment firms that increased investment, 
52.22 percent had board size in the largest quartile and 7.94 percent had board size in the 
lowest quartile. This reinforces the point that simple firms with large boards continued to invest 
more during the Depression, in comparison to simple firms with small boards. 
  We  further  analyze  the  data  to  ascertain  the  governance  structure  of  firms  that 
decreased investment in the Depression years. In  Table  VII  we  perform  cross-sectional 
regressions of change in investment on firm characteristics over the Depression period. Similar   19
to Table V, the changes in the various variables are calculated as the change from 1930 to 1938 
and the other firm characteristics are at their median values over the Depression years. We 
perform separate regressions for simple and complex firms. We find that the indicator variable 
for a decrease in board size (number of outside directors) is significantly negative in the simple 
firm  regressions.  Similarly,  the  indicator  variable  for  an  increase  in  board  size  (number  of 
outside directors) is significantly negative in the complex firm regressions. This indicates that, 
on average, simple firms which decreased board sizes, and complex firms which increased their 
board sizes, reduced investment during the Depression era.  
  In summary, we find that, on average, simple firms with larger boards did not downsize 
during the Depression, relative to simple firms with smaller boards (and also relative to complex 
firms). This outcome is consistent with the idea that larger boards (with more outside directors) 
led to inefficient choices among simple firms, perhaps due to coordination issues or director 
free-riding  (Lipton  and  Lorsch,  1992;  Jensen,  1993),  which  is  more  conducive  to  empire-
building. Such actions could lead to lower valuation during the Depression, consistent with the 
market valuation results of Table II in which simple firms with large boards had lower Tobin’s Q. 
We investigate whether there is a direct link in the next section.  
D. Linking Corporate Policies to Firm Valuation 
  In this section we attempt to directly link investment (and debt) policy to firm value, that 
is, to link the results in Table VI (and Table IV) to those in Table II. Our hypothesis is that firms 
that invest more (or shrink less) and use more debt (or retire debt slowly) during the Depression 
years  are  inefficient.  This  seems  reasonable  considering  that  this  was  a  period  of  rapidly 
declining  demand and  increasing  real  cost  of  debt.  In  Table VIII  we  attempt  to directly  link 
Depression  era  debt  usage  and  investment  policy  to  changes  in  firm  value  during  the 
Depression.  This  analysis  uses  change  in  Tobin’s  Q  as  the  left  hand  side  variable.  After 
controlling for factors such as liquidity, tangibility, etc., we find that corporate investment and 
debt usage are negatively related to changes in Tobin’s Q during the Depression. This evidence 
is consistent with investment and debt policies being two avenues by which corporate policies 
affect firm valuation, and thus connects our results in Table II with Table IV and Table VI. 
E. Intertemporal Changes in Board Structure 
  The previous results are consistent with the exogenous shock of the Great Depression 
throwing firms  out  of equilibrium  with  respect  to  governance.  If  this  is  true,  we  should  also 
observe firms with poor governance structures attempting to change their board structures.    20
  In untabulated analysis we find that intertemporal changes in the governance variables 
(board size and number of outside directors) increase in the Depression relative to the pre-
Depression  years.  On  average,  in  the  pre-Depression  years, board  size  and the  number  of 
outside directors remained relatively constant each year. In contrast, during the Depression, 
mean  board  size  decreased  by  0.06  per  year  and  the  mean  number  of  outside  directors 
decreased by 0.05 annually. Also, the standard deviation of the intertemporal changes in board 
size (number of outside directors) increased to 1.34 (1.34) in the Depression, compared to 1.10 
(1.28) in the pre-Depression years. These results provide evidence that firms changed their 
governance  structures as  they  attempted  to  survive  the  Depression.  This  increase  in  board 
activity is consistent with the corporate sector having been thrown out of equilibrium at the onset 
of the Depression, and then making changes to re-equilibrate.  
  Further, in the case of small firms (single-segment), compared to the pre-Depression 
years,  during  the  Depression  years  there  was  a  significant  decrease  of  0.30  (0.33)  in  the 
average board size and of 0.19 (0.21) in the mean number of outside directors. In the case of 
complex firms (multi-segment), the average board size increased by 0.24 (0.13) and the mean 
number of outside directors increased by 0.07 (0.02) compared to the pre-Depression years, 
though these changes are not significant at the ten percent level. This shows that the shrinkage 
rate for boards was significant for simple firms; that is, simple firms downsized boards during the 
Depression in response to the negative economic environment, which is consistent with their 
boards being somewhat too large (too outside) following the onset of the Depression.   
F. Executive Turnover 
  In the above analysis we examined corporate debt usage and investment decisions 
and linked them to the governance structure. Now, we study one direct decision taken by the 
board;  the  decision  to  fire  a  non-performing  company  President.  We  hand-collect  data  on 
Presidents for the firms in our sample for the pre-Depression and Depression years. As these 
data are from the 1920s and 1930s we cannot perform news searches to determine whether the 
President was forced out or left voluntarily (e.g., as in Huson, Parrino, and Starks, 2001). Thus, 
our analysis is on the entire sample of presidential turnover.  
  In untabulated tests we perform logistic regressions where the dependent variable is 
one when the President changed in a given firm-year, and zero otherwise. The independent 
variables are the one year lagged market-adjusted return, firm size, an interaction term and a 
stand-alone board size variable. For simple firms, the interaction variable is the product of the 
lagged market-adjusted return and a indicator variable equal to one if the board is in the lowest 
quartile of board size (or number of outside directors), and the stand-alone variable is a small   21
board size indicator. For complex firms, the interaction term is the product of the lagged market-
adjusted return and an indicator variable equal to one if the board is in the highest quartile of 
board  size  (or  number  of  outside  directors)  and  the  stand-alone  variable  is  a  large  board 
indicator. The coefficient on the lagged market-adjusted return variable is significantly negative 
in all models. The interaction term is negative in both specifications, though significant only for 
simple firms. This indicates that the probability of presidential turnover is significantly higher for 
poor performance in the case of simple firms with a smaller board size. For complex firms with a 
larger board size too, the probability of presidential turnover is higher for poor performance, 
though not significant at the ten percent level. This shows that the probability of the President 
being fired for poor performance increases in firms with governance structures more properly 
aligned to their advising needs in the Depression years.  
  While interesting in its own right, this result also lends credence to our earlier results 
on  debt and  investment  policies  which  showed  that  firms  with  better  governance  structures 
decreased debt and investment during the Depression years, which increased firm value. Thus, 
it  appears  that  firms  with  aligned  boards  took  direct  decisions  (such  as  replacing  a  poorly 
performing President) and other decisions (specifically debt and investment policies) which were 
beneficial to the firm. 
G. Endogeneity and Robustness Tests 
  The results so far document a relation between board size and firm value, investment 
policy, and debt usage during the 1930s. One advantage of our experiment is that the Great 
Depression can be considered exogenous to any given firm. This makes it harder to argue that 
reverse causality could drive our results, especially considering the differing results for simple 
versus complex firms conditional on board characteristics.  
  Nonetheless,  we  perform  additional  (untabulated)  robustness  checks  to  further 
mitigate concerns of reverse causality. (For example, perhaps simple firms increase board size 
after increasing debt, to boost monitoring.) First, we perform the regressions of Tobin’s Q, debt 
usage and investment on data from the pre-Depression (1926-1929) and the post-Depression 
years (1939-41). We find no relation between board size or number of outside directors with 
Tobin’s Q, debt usage or investment in either the period before or after the Depression ended. 
Thus,  the  only  period  during  which  we  find  a  relation  between  board  characteristics  and 
corporate value and corporate policies is during the Depression era. These before, during, after 
findings  make  it  seem  less  likely  that  our  Depression  results  are  hard-wired  or  driven  by 
endogeneity or reverse causality.     22
  Secondly,  we  estimate  a  3-stage  least  squares  (3SLS)  equation  to  address 
endogeneity concerns. This allows us to estimate debt usage (or investment) as a function of 
board size (or log of outside directors) and simultaneously estimate board size (or log of outside 
directors) as a function of debt usage (or investment). In the first stage, we predict board size 
(or log of outside directors) using as instruments the firm’s age, the lag of the ratio of the firm’s 
board size to the industry median board size (or ratio of firm’s number of outside directors to the 
industry median number of outside directors), and the lagged percentage of outside directors. In 
the second stage we use predicted board size (or predicted log of outside directors) as a right-
hand variable in the debt usage (or investment) specification.  
   We find that  board  size  is  significant  as  a  right-hand-side  variable  in  the debt  (or 
investment) specification. In contrast, in the first stage regressions, debt usage (or investment) 
is  not  significant  as  a  right-hand-side  variable  in  predicting  board  size  (or  log  of  outside 
directors). Thus, causality appears to run in one direction only, from board size to debt usage 
(or investment). Further, the results are similar to Tables IV and VI: board size is positively 
related to debt usage (or investment) among simple firms and not related for complex firms. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
  In  this  paper  we assess  the  impact  of board attributes  on  corporate  valuation and 
decisions. We examine a sample of firms from 1926 to 1941, the years before, during, and after 
the  Depression  era.  In  addition  to  this  period  being  historically  very  important,  it  is  also 
interesting because it includes a period of prosperity, followed by a severe negative economic 
shock, followed by a return to relative stability. Moreover, the Depression can be viewed as an 
exogenous event at the firm level and hence provides an ideal setting to test our predictions in a 
‘before-and-after’ comparison. 
  We find results that support the implications of agency theory. Board size is positively 
related to corporate investment in simple firms during the Depression. Moreover, we show that 
board size in simple firms has a strong positive association with debt usage in the Depression 
years. Overall, this is consistent with managers that work in companies with suboptimal boards 
pursuing their own objectives of ‘empire preservation’ at the cost of shareholder value. 
  Finally, we analyze executive turnover during the 1930s. Our results indicate that firms 
with properly aligned board structure (e.g., smaller boards for simple firms) were more likely to 
replace the company president following poor performance.   23
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Appendix: Description of Variables  
Variable  Definitions 
Tobin’s Q   Total liabilities plus market capitalization of the firm, divided by total assets 
Growth Options  Market capitalization divided by book value of equity 
Operating Profit    Earnings before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets 
Volatility  Standard deviation of the firm’s stock price over the 12 months of the 
previous year 
Leverage  Ratio of total debt to total assets 
Tangibility  Ratio of fixed assets to total assets   
Firm Size  Log of total assets 
Liquidity  Ratio of cash to total assets 
Investment  Change in the dollar value of gross fixed assets from t-1 to t, divided by 
total assets. 
Debt Usage  Change in the dollar value of total debt, divided by total assets 
LARGE Dummy  Equal to one for firms in the top 25 percent of all firms based on total 
assets in a given year   
MULTISEGMENT Dummy  Equal to one for firms operating in more than one business segment 
Board Size  Log of the total number of board members 
Ln(Outside Directors)  Log of total number of outside directors of the firm 
Percentage of Outside 
Directors   Percentage of directors who are not officers of the firm   26
Table I 
Summary Statistics 
Panel  A  presents  descriptive  statistics  for  our  sample  firms.  The  sample  consists  of  4,797  annual 
observations for 446 industrial companies between 1926 and 1938. The table reports the mean and 
median values of relevant variables for the pre-Depression (1926-29) and Depression years (1930-38). 
Two-sided p-values are reported in parentheses. Panel B compares board structures across small and 
large firms. The firms in the first 3 size quartiles based on total assets per year are grouped as small firms 
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  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median 








Book Value of Total 
Assets ($ million) 




















Percentage of Outside 
Directors 








Pre-Depression years (1926-1929) 
  Board Size  Outside Directors  Percentage of Outside Directors 
  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
Small Firms  10.16  9.00  6.27  6.00  59.46  61.54 
Large Firms  14.08  14.00  9.14  9.00  63.33  66.67 
p-value of difference  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
Depression years (1930-1938) 
Small Firms  9.86  9.00  6.07  6.00  59.12  60.00 
Large Firms   14.32  13.00  9.24  9.00  62.13  66.67 
p-value of difference   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   27
Table II 
Regression of Tobin’s Q on Firm Characteristics for the Depression Years 
This table presents the results of a firm fixed effects regression of market valuation on firm characteristics 
for the Depression years, 1930-1938. Columns (1) and (3) use board size as the governance variable, 
while columns (2) and (4) use ln(outside directors). The regressions have an unreported intercept term. 
Two-sided  p-values  are  reported  in  parentheses.  ***,  **,  *  represent  significance  at  1,  5,  and  10%, 
respectively.   
 
 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Operating Profit  2.056***  2.046***  2.030***  2.028*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Volatility  0.011***  0.011***  0.011***  0.011*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Leverage  0.251**  0.262**  0.241**  0.264** 
  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.03) 
LARGE Dummy  -1.215***  -0.655***     
  (0.00)  (0.00)     
MULTISEGMENT Dummy      -1.107**  -0.362 
      (0.04)  (0.42) 
Tangibility  -0.305***  -0.302***  -0.330***  -0.328*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Liquidity  0.645***  0.604***  0.647***  0.628*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Board Size  -0.127*    -0.133*   
  (0.06)    (0.07)   
Board Size * LARGE Dummy  0.436***       
  (0.00)       
Board Size * MULTISEGMENT Dummy      0.345***   
      (0.01)   
Ln(Outsider Directors)    -0.139**    -0.155*** 
    (0.01)    (0.01) 
Ln(Outsider Directors)* LARGE Dummy    0.274***     
    (0.00)     
Ln(Outsider Directors)* MULTISEGMENT Dummy        0.270*** 
        (0.00) 
Percentage of Outside Directors  0.102  0.298*  0.115  0.332** 
  (0.24)  (0.06)  (0.19)  (0.04) 
Firm and Year Indicators  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.746  0.748  0.745  0.747   28
Table III 
Cross-Sectional Regressions of Change in Tobin’s Q on Board Changes over the Depression period 
This table presents the result of the cross-sectional regressions of change in Tobin’s Q on firm characteristics over the Depression years, 1930-
1938 period. The change variables are calculated as changes for each firm from 1930 to 1938. The other firm characteristics are at their median 
values over the years 1930-1938. Two-sided p-values are reported in parentheses. The regressions have an unreported intercept term. ***, **, * 
represent significance at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Small Firms  Single-segment Firms  Large Firms  Multi-segment Firms 
Change in Growth Options  0.108***  0.108***  0.111***  0.110***  0.256***  0.256***  0.137***  0.139*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Change in Operating Profit  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.008  -0.008  -0.003  -0.003 
  (0.93)  (0.93)  (0.96)  (0.96)  (0.15)  (0.17)  (0.57)  (0.59) 
Volatility  0.001  0.002  0.006  0.007  0.002  -0.001  -0.006  -0.009 
  (0.92)  (0.85)  (0.70)  (0.64)  (0.75)  (0.91)  (0.31)  (0.13) 
Leverage  -0.208  -0.181  -0.275  -0.242  0.142  0.147  0.287  0.304 
  (0.57)  (0.62)  (0.48)  (0.53)  (0.54)  (0.53)  (0.21)  (0.18) 
Tangibility  0.414*  0.433*  0.434*  0.463*  -0.127  -0.122  -0.189  -0.196 
  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.40)  (0.42)  (0.24)  (0.22) 
Liquidity  0.069  0.133  0.098  0.164  -0.914  -1.017  -1.628*  -1.813** 
  (0.94)  (0.89)  (0.92)  (0.87)  (0.27)  (0.23)  (0.06)  (0.04) 
Change in Board Size < 0  0.179*    0.221**           
  (0.07)    (0.04)           
Change in No. of Outside Directors < 0    0.165*    0.198*         
    (0.09)    (0.06)         
Change in Board Size > 0          0.128**    0.139**   
          (0.04)    (0.03)   
Change in No. of Outside Directors > 0            0.115*    0.160** 
            (0.06)    (0.01) 
Firm and Year Indicators  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.148  0.147  0.152  0.149  0.386  0.380  0.306  0.317   29
Table IV 
Regression of Debt Usage on Firm Characteristics for the Depression Years 
This table reports the result of the firm fixed effects regression of debt usage on firm characteristics for 
the Depression years, 1930-1938. Columns (1) and (3) use board size as the governance variable, while 
columns (2) and (4) use ln(outside directors). The regressions have an unreported intercept term. Two-
sided  p-values  are  reported  in  the  parentheses.  ***,  **,  *  represent  significance  at  1,  5,  and  10%, 
respectively. 
 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Growth Options  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002  -0.001 
  (0.58)  (0.63)  (0.50)  (0.61) 
Operating Profit  0.016  0.018  0.018  0.018 
  (0.36)  (0.31)  (0.31)  (0.30) 
Volatility  0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.97)  (1.00)  (1.00)  (0.96) 
Leverage  -0.596***  -0.597***  -0.597***  -0.600*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Tangibility  0.085***  0.084***  0.085***  0.084*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Investment  0.106***  0.107***  0.106***  0.106*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Firm Size  -0.004  -0.004  -0.005  -0.005 
  (0.49)  (0.54)  (0.40)  (0.44) 
LARGE Dummy  0.083**  0.018     
  (0.03)  (0.30)     
MULTISEGMENT Dummy      0.074  0.016 
      (0.28)  (0.77) 
Liquidity  -0.074***  -0.073***  -0.077***  -0.077*** 
  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Board Size  0.044***    0.044***   
  (0.00)    (0.00)   
Board Size*LARGE Dummy  -0.035**       
  (0.02)       
Board Size* MULTISEGMENT Dummy      -0.041**   
      (0.04)   
Ln(Outside Directors)    0.035***    0.037*** 
    (0.00)    (0.00) 
Ln(Outside Directors)* LARGE Dummy    -0.019     
    (0.10)*     
Ln(Outside Directors)* MULTISEGMENT Dummy        -0.026** 
        (0.02) 
Percentage of Outside Directors  -0.005  -0.074***  -0.007  -0.073*** 
  (0.72)  (0.00)  (0.60)  (0.00) 
Firm and Year Indicators  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.310  0.309  0.314  0.314   30
Table V 
Cross-Sectional Regression of Change in Debt Usage on Board Changes over the Depression period 
This table presents the result of the cross-sectional regressions of change in debt usage on firm characteristics over the Depression years, 1930-
1938. The change variables are calculated as changes for each firm from 1930 to 1938. The other firm characteristics are at their median values 
over the years 1930-1938. Two sided p-values are reported in parentheses. The regressions have an unreported intercept term. ***, **, * represent 
significance at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Small Firms  Single-segment Firms  Large Firms  Multi-segment Firms 
Change in Growth Options  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.007  -0.008  -0.005**  -0.005** 
  (0.96)  (0.99)  (0.57)  (0.54)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Change in Operating Profit  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.71)  (0.71)  (0.78)  (0.78)  (0.74)  (0.73)  (0.77)  (0.78) 
Volatility  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  -0.002  -0.002  0.000  0.000 
  (0.12)  (0.15)  (0.21)  (0.31)  (0.50)  (0.55)  (0.80)  (0.84) 
Leverage  -0.156***  -0.157***  -0.151***  -0.152***  -0.123  -0.116  -0.108  -0.107 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.19)  (0.22)  (0.13)  (0.13) 
Tangibility  0.069**  0.059**  0.055*  0.046  -0.031  -0.029  0.039  0.040 
  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.13)  (0.62)  (0.65)  (0.46)  (0.45) 
Investment  0.144***  0.144***  0.150***  0.149***  0.254***  0.252***  0.231***  0.235*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Firm Size  -0.009  -0.009  -0.002  -0.001  -0.012  -0.012  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.16)  (0.18)  (0.81)  (0.93)  (0.41)  (0.40)  (1.00)  (0.98) 
Liquidity  -0.131  -0.140  -0.096  -0.096  -0.485  -0.470  -0.361  -0.361 
  (0.24)  (0.21)  (0.42)  (0.42)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.17)  (0.17) 
Change in Board Size < 0  -0.029**    -0.028**           
  (0.01)    (0.02)           
Change in No. of Outside Directors < 0    -0.024**    -0.023*         
    (0.04)    (0.07)         
Change in Board Size > 0          0.017    -0.005   
          (0.54)    (0.83)   
Change in No. of Outside Directors > 0            0.011    0.002 
            (0.65)    (0.93) 
Firm and Year Indicators  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.145  0.139  0.132  0.126  0.194  0.192  0.244  0.244   31
Table VI 
Regression of Investment on Firm Characteristics for the Depression years 
This table presents the result of the firm fixed effects regression of investment on firm characteristics for 
the Depression years, 1930-1938. Columns (1) and (3) use board size as the governance variable, while 
columns (2) and (4) use ln(outside directors). Two-sided p-values are reported in the parentheses. The 
regressions  have  an  unreported  intercept  term.    ***,  **,  *  represent  significance  at  1,  5,  and  10%, 
respectively. 
 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Growth Options  0.012***  0.013***  0.012***  0.013*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Operating Profit  0.006  0.004  0.004  0.001 
  (0.84)  (0.91)  (0.90)  (0.98) 
Volatility  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.88)  (0.87)  (0.90)  (0.88) 
Tangibility  -0.477***  -0.477***  -0.479***  -0.480*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Firm Size  -0.126***  -0.131***  -0.129***  -0.133*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
LARGE Dummy  0.115*  0.022     
  (0.08)  (0.46)     
MULTISEGMENT Dummy      0.184  0.052 
      (0.13)  (0.59) 
Board Size  0.075***    0.084***   
  (0.00)    (0.00)   
Board Size* LARGE Dummy  -0.055**       
  (0.04)       
Board Size* MULTISEGMENT Dummy      -0.078**   
      (0.03)   
Ln(Outside Directors)    0.057***    0.061*** 
    (0.00)    (0.00) 
Ln(Outside Directors)* LARGE Dummy    -0.027*     
    (0.10)     
Ln(Outside Directors)* MULTISEGMENT Dummy        -0.035* 
        (0.07) 
Percentage of Outside Directors  0.020  -0.076*  0.017  -0.078* 
 
(0.40)  (0.08)  (0.48)  (0.07) 
 
Firm and Year Indicators  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.219  0.215  0.219  0.215 
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Table VII 
Cross-Sectional Regressions of Change in Investment on Board Changes over the Depression period 
This table presents the result of the cross-sectional regressions of change in investment on firm characteristics over the Depression years, 1930-
1938 period. The change variables are calculated as changes for each firm from 1930 to 1938. The other firm characteristics are at their median 
values over the years 1930-1938. Two-sided p-values are reported in parentheses. The regressions have an unreported intercept term. ***, **, * 
represent significance at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Small Firms  Single-segment Firms  Large Firms  Multi-segment Firms 
Change in Growth Options  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.012  -0.011  -0.003  -0.003 
  (0.32)  (0.39)  (0.30)  (0.37)  (0.27)  (0.28)  (0.41)  (0.40) 
Change in Operating Profit  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.99)  (0.99)  (0.92)  (0.92)  (0.34)  (0.31)  (0.45)  (0.42) 
Volatility  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002  -0.003  0.008*  0.008  0.006  0.005 
 
(0.71)  (0.62)  (0.54)  (0.39)  (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.14)  (0.16) 
Tangibility  -0.287***  -0.309***  -0.289***  -0.312***  -0.311***  -0.332***  -0.307***  -0.324*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Firm Size  0.026*  0.028*  0.038**  0.040***  -0.032  -0.029  0.014  0.019 
 
(0.07)  (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.20)  (0.25)  (0.50)  (0.38) 
Change in Board Size < 0  -0.048**    -0.044*           
 
(0.05)    (0.09)           
Change in No. of Outside Directors < 0    -0.059**    -0.060**         
 
  (0.02)    (0.02)         
Change in Board Size > 0          -0.113**    -0.094**   
          (0.02)    (0.04)   
Change in No. of Outside Directors > 0            -0.100**    -0.080* 
            (0.02)    (0.05) 
                 
Firm and Year Indicators  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.093  0.098  0.098  0.105  0.174  0.173  0.127  0.122 
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Table VIII 
Regression of Change in Tobin’s Q on Firm Characteristics for the Depression years 
This  table  presents  the  result  of  the  firm  fixed  effects  regression  of  change  in  Tobin’s  Q  on  firm 
characteristics for the Depression years, 1930-1938. Two-sided p-values are reported in parentheses. 
The regressions have an unreported intercept term. ***, **, * represent significance at 1, 5, and 10%, 
respectively. 
 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Change in Growth Options  0.640***  0.640***  0.640***  0.640***  0.640***  0.640*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Change in Operating Profit  0.043  0.042  0.043  0.042  0.043  0.042 
  (0.48)  (0.49)  (0.48)  (0.49)  (0.47)  (0.49) 
Volatility  -0.001**  -0.001*  -0.001**  -0.001*  -0.001**  -0.001** 
  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Leverage  -0.031  -0.032  -0.031  -0.031  -0.034  -0.033 
  (0.71)  (0.71)  (0.72)  (0.71)  (0.69)  (0.69) 
LARGE Dummy  0.016    0.016    0.021   
  (0.58)    (0.59)    (0.49)   
MULTISEGMENT Dummy    -0.245    -0.244    -0.246 
    (0.24)    (0.25)    (0.24) 
Tangibility  -0.129**  -0.131**  -0.129**  -0.131**  -0.129**  -0.131** 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Liquidity  -0.127  -0.130  -0.127  -0.130  -0.125  -0.128 
  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.20)  (0.19) 
Debt Usage  -0.155**  -0.154*  -0.148*  -0.153*  -0.153*  -0.153* 
  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.06) 
Debt Usage *LARGE Dummy      -0.054       
      (0.78)       
Debt Usage * MULTISEGMENT Dummy        -0.008     
        (0.96)     
Investment  -0.071  -0.073*  -0.071  -0.073*  -0.090*  -0.093* 
  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Investment*LARGE Dummy          0.103   
          (0.31)   
Investment* MULTISEGMENT Dummy            0.088 
 
          (0.36) 
 
Firm and Year Indicators  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.812  0.811  0.812  0.811  0.812  0.811   
 